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July 28, 2026

The Trump administration has declared Cuba an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to U.S. national security to justify the most sweeping expansion of sanctions against the island in decades. The State Department’s official statements and its recent report, Cuba: The Capital of 21st Century Communism, similarly advance sweeping ideological claims without presenting credible evidence to support such an extraordinary determination. The Alliance for Cuba Engagement and Respect (ACERE) has already warned that the Trump administration is using false and unsubstantiated claims to justify the possibility of military action against Cuba.[i]

ACERE’s Fact Sheet “Is Cuba a National Security Threat?”[ii] demonstrates that the available evidence points not to Cuba as a threat to the United States, but to current U.S. Cuba policy as a growing threat to American national security interests. The Trump administration’s de facto fuel blockade and expanding sanctions have contributed to a severe humanitarian crisis just ninety miles from U.S. shores, increasing migration pressures, weakening Cuba’s emerging private sector, and straining relations with allies.[iii] They have also eroded—both in terms of operational capacity and mutual trust—long-established channels for cooperation on migration, counternarcotics, law enforcement, intelligence sharing, counterterrorism, and regional security.

In fact, the national security threat claim is particularly difficult to reconcile with the U.S. government’s own longstanding assessment that security cooperation with Cuba advances American interests. The State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism have recognized bilateral working groups on counterterrorism, counternarcotics, border security, human smuggling, and financial crimes, while describing Cuban law enforcement and border security institutions as effective partners against transnational security threats. The Congressional Research Service has likewise reported that U.S.-Cuba counternarcotics cooperation expanded significantly after diplomatic relations were restored, including direct coordination between the U.S. Coast Guard, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and Cuban authorities. Cuba has shared real-time intelligence on suspected drug-trafficking vessels, assisted U.S. criminal investigations and prosecutions, and maintained operational communication with the U.S. Coast Guard because both countries share a fundamental interest in preventing narcotics trafficking, terrorism, migrant smuggling, and other forms of transnational crime in the Florida Straits and the Caribbean basin. Weakening these channels of cooperation does not make the United States safer—it weakens one of the few areas in which both governments have consistently worked together to protect the American homeland.[iv]

The weakness of the Trump administration’s case is further highlighted by the assessments of former intelligence and national security officials. Former National Intelligence Officer Fulton Armstrong has stated that there has been no evidence since the Cuban Missile Crisis that Cuba has harbored offensive intentions toward the United States.[v] Former State Department counterterrorism official Jason M. Blazakis has argued that Cuba’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism was driven primarily by political considerations rather than evidence of terrorist activity.[vi] Former diplomat Ricardo Zúñiga has similarly concluded that the State Department’s report vastly exaggerates Cuba’s influence in the United States.[vii] Members of Congress who recently conducted bipartisan fact-finding missions to Cuba likewise reported finding no evidence that the island constitutes the extraordinary national security threat alleged by the administration, with Representative Mark Pocan concluding succinctly: “We have seen no proof. Congress needs to demand it.”[viii]

ACERE therefore stresses that escalating confrontation with Cuba while dismantling productive bilateral security cooperation does not make the United States safer—it makes the United States less secure. We call on Congress to require the Trump administration to publicly present the evidence supporting its extraordinary national emergency declaration, require explicit congressional authorization before any military action against Cuba is contemplated, and insist that the United States pursue diplomacy and expanded security cooperation—not further escalation. Moreover, Congress ought to demand accountability for the national security and humanitarian consequences of current U.S. Cuba policy. Rather than pursuing a path toward another unnecessary military conflict, the United States should restore diplomacy, strengthen cooperation on matters of mutual security, and engage the Cuban government in serious negotiations. Protecting America’s national security and advancing stability in the Caribbean require de-escalation, evidence-based policymaking, and sustained diplomatic engagement—not a policy of perpetual confrontation.

For more information, see ACERE Fact Sheet “Is Cuba a National Security Threat?”


Notes:

[i] “ACERE Warns the Trump Administration is Using False Claims to Justify Military Action Against Cuba,” July 20, 2026, https://acere.org/acere-warns-the-trump-administration-is-using-false-claims-to-justify-military-action-against-cuba

[ii]  ACERE Fact Sheet “Is Cuba a National Security Threat?” https://acere.org/is-cuba-a-natl-sec-threat  

[iii] “ACERE Stresses That U.S. Policy Is Causing Blackouts and Deaths in Cuba,” July 14, 2026, https://acere.org/acere-stresses-that-u-s-policy-is-causing-blackouts-and-deaths-in-cuba

[iv] Congressional Research Service Report R45657 “Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress and Through the Trump Administration” by Sullivan, 202,  https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R45657

[v] “Does Cuba Really Have Iranian Drones? Experts say Trump is laying the pretext for U.S. military action against the island,” Foreign Policy, July 17 https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/07/17/cuba-iran-drones-trump-venezuela-us-military/

[vi] Jason M. Blazakis, “The Pretext Behind the Trump Administration Labeling Cuba a State Sponsor of Terrorism.” Just Security (May 29, 2026). https://www.justsecurity.org/140246/trump-administration-cuba-terrorism/

[vii] William M. LeoGrande, “Is the United States on the Verge of Military Intervention in Cuba?” Foreign Policy (May 22, 2026). https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/05/22/cuba-war-trump-united-states-castro-indictment/

[viii] “ACERE Welcomes Long-Overdue Congressional Oversight of U.S. Cuba Policy,” July 15, 2026, https://acere.org/acere-welcomes-long-overdue-congressional-oversight-of-u-s-cuba-policy/


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